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Abstract 
 
To investigate experts’ imagery in chess, players were required to recall briefly-presented 
positions in which the pieces were placed on the intersections between squares 
(intersection positions).  Position types ranged from game positions to positions where both 
the piece distribution and location were randomized.  Simulations were run with the 
CHREST model (Gobet & Simon, 2000). The simulations assumed that pieces had to be 
centered back one by one to the middle of the squares in the mind’s eye before chunks 
could be recognized. Consistent with CHREST’s predictions, chess players (N = 36), 
ranging from weak amateurs to grandmasters, exhibited much poorer recall on intersection 
positions than on standard positions (pieces placed on centers of squares). On the 
intersection positions, the skill difference in recall was larger on game positions than on the 
randomized positions. Participants recalled bishops better than knights, suggesting that 
Stroop-like interference impairs recall of the latter. The data supported both the time 
parameter in CHREST for shifting pieces in the mind’s eye (125 ms per piece) and the 
seriality assumption.  In general, the study reinforces the plausibility of CHREST as a model 
of cognition.  
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Mental Imagery and Chunks: Empirical and Computational Findings 
Ever since Binet’s (1894) work on blindfold chess, psychologists have investigated the role 
of mental images in expert problem solving (e.g., Simon, 1978; Larkin, Mc Dermott, Simon, 
& Simon, 1980; Larkin & Simon, 1987; Paige & Simon, 1966; Tabachnek-Schijf, Leonardo, 
& Simon, 1997). The concept of chunking has also been shown to be essential in experts’ 
perception, memory, and problem solving (e.g., Campitelli & Gobet, 2005; Chase & Simon, 
1973a, 1973b; De Groot, 1978; Kalakoski, 2006; Saariluoma, 1995).  However, despite the 
wealth of research investigating chunking and mental imagery as separate topics, less is 
known about the interaction between chunking and mental imagery. The goal of this article 
is to provide experimental evidence about this interaction, and to test the predictions of a 
well-established computational theory of expertise.   
Mental Imagery in Chess 
Chase and Simon’s (1973b) influential chunking theory proposed that pattern 
recognition explains (a) how experts show a remarkable memory for domain-specific 
material and (b) how search can be carried out in the mind’s eye, where future positions are 
imagined.  According to these authors, the mental processes used in chess playing are 
similar to those identified in mental rotation and other imagery tasks (Shepard & Cooper, 
1982).  Chase and Simon’s ideas about the mind’s eye have not been thoroughly tested, but 
the existence of chunks is well established (Chase & Simon, 1973b; Gobet & Clarkson, 
2004; Gobet & Simon, 1998).   
Empirical evidence on imagery in chess comes from studies on blindfold chess (e.g., 
Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1997) and studies that have attempted to measure the time 
needed to move a piece in the mind’s eye (Church & Church, 1977; Milojkovic, 1982; 
Gruber, 1991; Waghorn, 1988). In general, these experiments have confirmed that (a) chess 
memory has a significant visuo-spatial component, and (b) mental imagery has an important 
role in chess. For example, Bachman and Oit (1992) studied mental imagery using a 
variation of Attneave and Curlee's (1983) moving-spot task. Chess players and non-players 
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were presented with either an 8 x 8 grid or a chessboard. They were then required to close 
their eyes, listen to a sequence of instructions about the moves of the spot or a chess piece 
(up, down, right or left), and imagine following the spot or piece at it moves.  At the end of 
the sequence of moves, participants had to indicate the end position of the spot or the piece. 
There were no skill differences in the moving-spot (8 x 8 grid) condition, but non-players 
made more errors than chess players in the moving-chess piece (chessboard) condition. 
Furthermore, in the latter condition, skilled players tended to show Stroop-like interference 
when required to mentally shift a piece in an atypical fashion. For example, chess players 
found it difficult to imagine a Bishop moving horizontally (which is incongruent with its typical 
diagonal movement).  
As noted above, mental imagery played an essential role in Chase and Simon’s 
(1973a; 1973b) influential chunking theory.  More recently, the mechanisms of pattern 
recognition, forward search and mental imagery have also been integrated in a modification 
of the chunking theory, the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996b).  The template theory 
has led to two related computational implementations: one aimed as simulating search 
behavior (SEARCH: Gobet, 1997), and the other predominantly aimed at simulating 
perception, learning, and memory (CHREST: De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet et al., 2001; 
Gobet & Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003). 
CHREST 
CHREST is a model of learning and expertise that has accounted for data on chess 
perception, learning, and memory (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet et al., 2001; Gobet & 
Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003), the use of diagrammatic information in physics (Lane, 
Cheng, & Gobet, 2000), the acquisition of vocabulary (Jones, Gobet, & Pine, 2005), and the 
acquisition of syntactic structures (Freudenthal, Pine, & Gobet 2005; Freudenthal, Pine, & 
Gobet, 2006). CHREST, written in Common Lisp, can be obtained from the second author. 
CHREST consists of four main components: a simulated eye, a long-term memory 
(LTM), where chunks are stored, a visual STM with a capacity of 3 items, and a mind’s eye 
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system (see Figure 1 for overview).  Briefly, CHREST is a self-organizing, dynamical 
system, in which chunks are accessed by traversing a discrimination net (see De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996, for details). .A discrimination net is a treelike structure consisting of a set of 
nodes (chunks) connected by links.  The links have tests, which are applied to check 
features of the external stimuli.   
There has been debate as to how chunks are coded in chess. Some authors (e.g., 
Simon & Gilmartin, 1973) have proposed that chunks encode information about location 
(localization assumption). Others (e.g., Holding, 1985) have suggested that chunks do not 
encode location information, but only the pattern of relation between pieces. Thus the same 
chunk could be used for coding a pattern of pieces on the bottom left of the board, or the top 
right of the board. Experiments where boards where modified by translation (Saariluoma, 
1994) or mirror image (Gobet & Simon, 1996a) supported the localization assumption.  
Chunks that are often recognized evolve into more complex data structures, known 
as templates, which have slots allowing variables to be instantiated rapidly (filling in 
information into a template slot takes 250 ms).  In particular, information about piece 
location, piece type, or chunks can be (recursively) encoded into template slots.  Slots are 
created at chunks where there is substantial variation in squares, pieces, or groups of 
pieces in the test links below.  In addition to slots, templates contain a core, basically similar 
to the information stored in chunks.  Chunks and templates can be linked to other 
information stored in LTM, such as moves, plans, and tactical motives (see Ferrari, 
Didierjean, & Marmèche, 2006, for data supporting for the idea that chunks are associated 
with possible moves). 
Eye movements are directed from a combination of acquired knowledge, mediated 
by the structure of the discrimination net, and heuristics (e.g., heeding a square attacked by 
the piece located on the currently fixated square) (see De Groot & Gobet, 1996, for details).  
The Mind’s Eye in CHREST 
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The mind’s eye construct in CHREST is similar to Kosslyn’s (1994) visual buffer and 
Baddeley’s visuo-sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986; Logie, 1986). It is specified in less detail than 
the former, in particular with respect to anatomical and neural considerations, but with more 
detail than the latter, which lacks a computational implementation. The architectural 
assumptions in CHREST resemble those in other models developed by Simon (in particular, 
CaMeRa, Tabachnek-Schijf et al., 1997, and EPAM-IV, Richman, Staszewski, & Simon, 
1995), and can be traced back to Chase and Simon’s (1973a) construct of the mind’s eye.  
The mind’s eye stores perceptual structures, both from external inputs and from 
memory stores, for a short time. The visuo-spatial information stored there can be subjected 
to visuo-spatial mental operations. In the mind’s eye, the internal representation of the 
external scene is encoded as a network of nodes and links (e.g., Larkin & Simon, 1987; 
Newell & Simon, 1972).  Note that the information in the mind’s eye abstracts much from 
perceptual information impinging the retina, which makes the task of pattern recognition 
mechanisms easier than with external perceptual information.  
A recurring feature of CHREST, influenced by Simon’s earlier work (e.g., Simon, 
1969), is the emphasis of cognitive limitations. There are limitations in memory capacity 
(visual STM can hold only three items) and learning rates (it takes about eight seconds to 
create a new chunk). Another limitation is that information in the mind’s eye decays rapidly, 
within around 250 ms  (Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Kosslyn, 1994).  
In addition, CHREST makes several assumptions about the processes that are 
carried out in the mind’s eye. For chess, these processes include the time to move a piece 
mentally; for problem solving in physics, these processes include instructions for drawings 
lines or more complex geometric figures (Lane et al., 2000). These mental processes are 
assumed (a) to take a definite amount of time (see below) and (b) to be carried out serially 
(“seriality assumption”; see Kosslyn, Cave, Provost, & Von Gierke, 1988, for data supporting 
the assumption that mental images are generated serially).  In addition, CHREST includes 
mechanisms linking LTM, STM, and the mind’s eye. It is assumed that learning leads to the 
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creation of chunks in LTM. When a chunk is elicited, either by external or internal 
information, a pointer to it is placed in STM.1 Concurrently, the visuo-spatial information 
referred to in LTM by this pointer is unpacked in the mind’s eye. As information in the mind’s 
eye fades rapidly, it needs to be refreshed regularly.  
Overview of the Study 
Several assumptions behind CHREST have been directly tested (Gobet & Simon, 
2000; Gobet & Jackson, 2002; De Groot & Gobet, 1996). However, there have been no 
experimental tests of CHREST’s assumptions and mechanisms about imagery. Using the 
few experiments available (noted above), De Groot and Gobet (1996, p. 236) proposed two 
parameters for the time to move pieces in the mind’s eye: the base parameter refers to the 
time needed to start the process of generating a move, while the square parameter 
estimates the time needed to move a piece over one square in the mind’s eye.  With players 
who are not novices, the base parameter was set to 100 ms and the square parameter was 
set to 50 ms. The present study directly tests the validity of these parameters. 
In addition, a strict interpretation of the localization assumption implies that 
decoupling pieces from their natural ground (the chessboard), for example by shifting them 
diagonally, should make the access to chunks harder. This is because pieces would have to 
be individually shifted back to the center of their squares in the mind’s eye to enable access 
to chunks. An alternative prediction would be that the relations between pieces are 
identifiable without reference to the ground (the board), and thus no shifting back is 
necessary. To decouple figure and ground, we created positions where the pieces were 
placed at the intersection of squares (rather than being placed in the middle of the squares). 
We will call these stimuli “intersection positions.” If chunks are recognized without the need 
to re-center pieces, then recall on the intersection positions should not differ from that on the 
standard positions. If, on the other hand, pieces need to be re-centered before chunks can 
be recognized, then there should be a decrease in performance. The size of this decrease 
can be predicted by running simulations with CHREST.  
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Two additional variables were manipulated. First, positions with different levels of 
structure were used (from game position to fully randomized positions). This manipulated 
the ease by which chunks could be accessed in LTM. Second, different skill levels were 
used, which was assumed to control for the number of chunks held in LTM. 
In the remainder of the paper, we first present a simulation that assesses recall for 
different position types across different skill levels (net sizes) (computer simulation 1). We 
then present human data that assesses recall on the same position types (human study 1). 
This is followed by an additional human study that assesses the specificity of the effects 
observed in human study 1 (human study 2), and an additional simulation that examines the 
seriality assumption of the mind’s eye (computer simulation 2).  
Computer Simulation Study 1 
Learning Phase 
During learning, the program scans a large number of positions.  For each position, 
the simulated eye is moved around the board, and patterns within CHREST’s visual field 
(defined as +/- 2 squares from the fixation point) are sent as input to the discrimination net, 
where the learning mechanisms of familiarization, discrimination, and template formation are 
applied (see de Groot & Gobet, 1996, and Gobet & Simon, 2000, for details on the model). 
Testing Phase 
Encoding. The model moves its simulated eye around the board, and attempts to 
recognize chunks (or templates).  The simulations reported below all used a presentation 
time of 5 s.  We used the same version of CHREST used by Gobet and Simon (2000) and 
Gobet and Waters (2003).  For the simulation of the intersection positions, we extended the 
model by adding as few assumptions as possible related to the time needed to carry out 
operations in the mind’s eye.  The augmented model attempts to memorize the intersection 
positions by serially moving pieces (up to 3) within the visual field to the center of the square 
in the mind’s eye and then sorting the (shifted) pattern of pieces through the discrimination 
net.   
   
  Mental Imagery and Chunks 
  
 
9
Figure 2 illustrates the processes involved in shifting a group of three pieces in the 
mind’s eye. It is assumed that the internal representations of the objects present in the 
external display (pieces on the intersection board) maintain a high activation as long as one 
is looking at these objects (cf. Kosslyn, 1994). By contrast, after shifting, the imaged 
(shifted) objects are subject to decay. Shifting the object or recognizing a chunk in the 
mind’s eye resets the level of activation of these objects to high. As with chunk recognition 
from an external input, recognition from the mind’s eye leads to a pointer being placed in 
STM (see above). 
 At time 0, the three pieces are perceived in the external display. At time 125 ms, the 
bishop has been shifted, and its activation is high. At time 250 ms, the rook has been shifted 
(high activation); in the meantime, the activation of the bishop has decayed to medium. At 
time 280 ms, a chunk (rook + bishop) has been recognized and a pointer to it entered into 
STM, and the activation of its components is set to high. Sorting information in the 
discrimination network has a base cost of 10 ms, plus 10 ms per item, giving a total of 30 
ms. At time 405 ms, the knight has been shifted, and the activation of the chunk (rook + 
bishop) has decreased to medium. At time 445 ms, a three-piece chunk (rook + bishop + 
knight) has been recognized and a pointer to it has replaced the previous pointer in STM.  
Recall. During recall, the model (re-)places pieces sequentially using the information 
provided by the chunks in STM. Possible conflicts (e.g., two chunks propose that two 
different pieces are placed on the same square) are resolved in sequence, based on the 
frequency with which each placement is proposed. The pieces were always re-shifted to the 
appropriate intersection (SE corner). This re-shifting assumption was predicated on the 
assumption that the direction of re-shifting was not problematic for humans. As noted below, 
participants learned the direction that pieces were shifted during practice, and the presence 
of pieces on the “back” White row (but not the “back” Black row) gave additional visual cues 
on every trial. In addition, the software assisted in piece re-placement (clicking a piece on a 
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square at a location sufficiently close to the intersection placed the piece at the intersection) 
(this was not simulated in the model).   
For the time needed to shift a piece (transition-time), we used the parameters 
already in CHREST for the time to move a piece diagonally for players who are not novices 
(100 ms as base time, and 50 ms for each square traversed).  We therefore assumed that, 
to re-center the pieces in the intersection positions, it takes the base time plus half of the 
time to traverse a square diagonally, i.e., 125 ms in total. This was true for discrimination 
nets of all sizes.  
Method 
Materials 
In common with Gobet and Waters (2003), we used five position types.  Game 
positions were taken from master games without any change.  Random positions were 
constructed by randomly reassigning the pieces of a game position to new squares.  In 
“truly” random positions, not only the location of the pieces was randomized, but also the 
distribution of pieces (e.g., there could be 12 white kings in a position, contrary to the 
standard chess rules).  One-third and two-third truly random positions were positions where 
1/3 and 2/3 of the pieces were truly randomized. 
The testing stimuli were created following the procedure described in Gobet and 
Waters (2003).  Five hundred stimuli were selected using random sampling without 
replacement from a database of 3,100 positions.  These positions were taken from master-
level games, after about 20 moves.  In the game condition, the stimuli were kept unmodified.  
The algorithms described in Gobet and Waters (2003) were used to generate the four types 
of random position.  The same procedures were used to generate the intersection stimuli, 
except that the end product was manipulated by shifting all pieces to the south-east corners 
of the squares.  Examples of all position types for the intersection positions are shown in 
Figure 3a. 
Procedure 
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To obtain quantitative predictions, we used the same nets as those chosen by Gobet 
and Waters (2003). The selection procedure was as follows.  During learning, the program 
scanned a database of about 50,000 positions.  The positions were middle-game positions, 
taken from master-level games played in the last fifty years.  This resulted in an original pool 
of 16 nets, from which four nets (with 1,010, 3,008, 15,003, and 300,009 chunks) were 
chosen.  These were selected as they most closely matched the mean recall of the four 
groups of human subjects on standard game positions.  To facilitate interpretation of data 
analyses, the 300,009-chunk net was considered to have a rating of 235.6 in “human” units 
(the mean skill rating of our top group of humans; see Gobet and Waters, 2003, for further 
detail on this strategy).2  The 15,003-chunk net was considered to have a rating of 201.2 in 
human units (the mean skill rating of our second group of humans), the 3,008-chunk net a 
rating of 150.9, and the 1,010-chunk net a rating of 112.3.  The simulations below are based 
on the recall of 500 positions of each type.  Each position was presented for a simulated 
time of 5 s.   
Data Reduction and Analysis 
All statistical analysis was carried out using SAS (SAS/STAT Software, 1997). To 
test differences in recall on the standard and intersection positions, we used a 2-way Layout 
(Standard vs. Intersection) by Position Type (5 levels: game, 1/3, 2/3, random, 3/3) ANOVA. 
On the intersection positions, we used linear regression to predict recall performance (the 
dependent variable) from Net Size (the independent variable, expressed in human units).  
We did this for each position type (game, 1/3, 2/3, random, 3/3) separately.  We used the 
unstandardized parameter estimates from these models as an index of the Net Size effect, 
and used the p value of the parameter estimate to determine whether the slope was 
significantly different from zero.  To determine whether the Net Size effect on one position 
type was steeper than that on other position types, we used regression analysis (proc glm in 
SAS) to test for Net Size by Position Type interactions, where Position Type was entered as 
   
  Mental Imagery and Chunks 
  
 
12 
a repeated measures variable.  To compare the Net Size effect on the game positions with 
the mean Net Size effect on the other positions, we used the helmert comparison option.   
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows recall as a function of Net Size and Position Type, for both standard 
(left side of table) and intersection positions (right side of table); for the latter, we focus for 
the time being on the serial transition type (upper row). Recall was clearly worse on the 
intersection positions. A 2-way Layout (Standard vs. Intersection) by Position Type (5 levels) 
ANOVA yielded a main effect of Layout, F (1, 3) = 29.9, p < .05, and a main effect of 
Position Type, F (4, 12) = 40.3, p < .0001. There was also a Layout by Position Type 
interaction, F (4, 12) = 15.8, p < .0001, indicating that deterioration in recall on the 
intersection positions was moderated by position type. Inspection of Table 1 indicates that 
the deterioration in recall on the intersection positions (vs. standard positions) was most 
pronounced on the game positions. This is because the model is slowed down by having to 
carry out the mental transformations. This prevents it from sampling a sufficient number of 
squares to access large chunks.   
On the intersection positions (right side of Table 1), the data indicate that the effect 
of Net Size is more robust on the game condition than on the randomized positions. The 
300k net achieved 44.8% recall of the game positions, whereas the 1k net only achieved 
23.7% recall. In contrast, on the 3/3 positions, the difference in recall was much smaller 
(10.7% vs. 4.1% for the 300k and 1k net, respectively). Numerical estimates of the Net Size 
effects were: game = 0.173; 1/3 = 0.092; 2/3 = 0.050; random = 0.051; and 3/3 = 0.057. The 
Net Size effects were all significantly differently from zero (p < .05), except for on the 
random positions, where the effect was a trend (p = .058). Statistical comparison of the Net 
Size effect on the game, 1/3, 2/3, random, and 3/3 position types indicated a robust Net  
Size x Position Type interaction, F (4, 8) = 66.1, p < .001. The effect of Net Size was 
significantly larger on the game positions than on the mean of the other position, F(1, 2) = 
571, p < .005. 
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In summary, four CHREST nets were created, corresponding to four levels of chess 
skill. The program then recalled briefly-presented positions (either standard or intersection) 
that ranged from game positions to fully random positions. Recall was poorer on the 
intersection positions than on the standard positions, particularly on the game positions. On 
the intersection positions, the skill effect was larger on the game positions than on the 
randomized positions. 
 
Human Study 1 
As noted earlier, this experiment was part of a larger study where standard positions 
were also presented. The main focus of Gobet and Waters (2003) was to test the conflicting 
predictions of CHREST and the Constraint Attunement Hypothesis (Vicente & Wang, 1998) 
on the role of constraints in expert memory. In the current study, the aims of the study were 
as follows. First, we wanted to test CHREST’s predictions on recall in the intersection 
positions. Thus, we examined whether (a) recall on the intersection positions was impaired 
(vs. recall on standard positions); (b) the effects of Skill were larger on the game positions 
than the randomized positions; and (c) the effects of Skill were significant on each position 
type.  
Second, given that the intersection task likely involves imagery, we also examined 
whether we could detect Stroop-like interference effects that had been previously observed 
using a different imagery task (Bachman & Oit, 1992). To do so, we compared recall of 
bishops and knights. These two pieces are considered to be of equal value (3 points), and 
therefore are matched in terms of “economic” salience on the chessboard. (It would be 
difficult to compare recall of rooks and bishops, because the former have greater value and 
might attract focus for this reason.) Critically, the bishop moves along a diagonal line, and so 
mental imagery on the intersection task is congruent with its typical movement. In contrast, 
the knight does not move diagonally, and so mental imagery with this piece is less 
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congruent with its typical movement3. Thus, if mental imagery were involved, we would 
expect participants to recall bishops better than knights (Bachman & Oit, 1992). 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six participants (mean age = 28.6, SD = 8.0) completed the study; they were 
the same participants who took part in the study reported by Gobet and Waters (2003), and 
the data reported here was obtained from the 2003 study. The top group (“grandmasters”, n 
= 7) were players with BCF (British Chess Federation) ratings of above 225. The second 
group (“masters/experts”, n = 12) had BCF ratings between 175 and 224. This group 
contained 3 IMs, 1 FIDE master, 1 female GM, 1 female IM, and 6 experts.  The third group 
(“Class A/B players”, n = 10) consisted of players with ratings between 125 and 174; these 
players are considered moderate to strong club players.  The final group (“Class C/D 
players”, n = 7) contained players with ratings less than BCF 125; while these players are 
considered weak club players, they are far from being novices.  Further details of the 
participants and experimental procedures are available in Gobet and Waters (2003). 
Materials. 
Chess stimuli.  The same five types of position were used as in the simulation study 
(see Figure 3a).  Twenty-five positions (with an average of 25 pieces) were taken from 
master games after about 20 moves, and were randomly assigned to one of the five types of 
intersection positions for each player.  There were thus five positions in each condition.   
 Presentation software and hardware.  Chess stimuli were presented on a portable 
Apple MacIntosh computer using specialized software for presenting chess stimuli and 
recording responses (see Gobet & Simon, 1998, for a detailed description of the software 
used).  Participants were required to use a mouse to select pieces, move pieces onto 
squares (standard positions) or intersections between squares (intersection positions), and 
delete pieces (Figure 3b).  To go on to the next trial, the subject pressed an OK button on 
the top left corner of the computer screen.  
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 Visual memory test.  All participants completed a test of visual memory (the Shape 
Memory Test (MV-1) of the Educational Testing Service [ETS] Kit of Factor-Referenced 
Cognitive Tests; Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Derman, 1976). 
Procedure 
Participants completed the visual memory test, followed by the recall task.  On each 
trial, a position was presented for 5 s.  The screen then was blank for 2 s, and then an 
empty chess board appeared.  The participants were instructed to try to recall the positions 
as completely and as accurately as possible.  On standard positions, the pieces were 
presented in the center of the squares, and participants were instructed to replace the 
pieces in the center of the squares (Figure 3b, upper panel). On intersection positions, the 
pieces were presented at the intersection of the squares (always in the south-east direction), 
and participants were instructed to replace the pieces at the intersection of the squares 
(Figure 3b, lower panel). In this condition, the software allowed the pieces at the intersection 
of squares (but not at the center of the squares). On each trial, participants had unlimited 
time to make their response.  
The presentation of standard and intersection positions was blocked, and the order 
of presentation counterbalanced over participants. Within each block (standard, 
intersection), the 20 random positions (4 position types x 5 stimuli) were first presented in a 
different random order for each subject.  The 5 game positions were then presented, also in 
a different random order for each subject.  Participants had two practice trials on random 
positions, and one practice trial on game positions.  
Data Reduction and Analysis 
To test differences in recall on the standard and intersection positions, we used a 2-
way Layout (Standard vs. Intersection) by Position Type (5 levels: game, 1/3, 2/3, random, 
3/3) ANOVA. On the intersection positions, to obtain estimates of the skill slopes, we 
performed regressions in which recall performance (the dependent variable) was predicted 
from BCF rating, age and visual memory (VM) entered together (the independent variables).  
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(Results of regression analyses for recall on the standard positions are reported in Gobet & 
Waters (2003)). As an index of chess skill, we used participants’ ratings in the BCF rating list 
at the time the data were collected.  Following Gobet and Waters (2003), we also included 
Age and VM in all the models.  Age has been shown to be an important variable in chess 
memory (Charness, 1981a, b), and VM has been associated with recall performance on this 
task (Waters, Gobet, & Leyden, 2002).   
Separate regressions were carried out for each position type.  The unstandardized 
parameter estimate for BCF rating provided our estimate of the skill slope, and the p value 
of this statistic determined whether it was significantly different from zero. (To facilitate direct 
comparisons between the coefficients, we also report the standardized parameter 
estimates).  To determine whether the skill slope on one position type was steeper than that 
on another position type, we tested BCF rating by Position Type interactions, where Position 
Type was entered as a repeated measures variable with five levels. Since the model makes 
directional and unambiguous predictions about recall performance on all conditions, we 
used 1-tailed tests for all analyses of skill effects on recall; 2-tailed tests were used for 
effects of age and VM on recall, and for all other analyses.  
To test differences in recall of bishops and knights on the intersection positions, we 
used a Piece (Bishop vs. Knight) by Position Type (5 levels: game, 1/3, 2/3, random, and 
3/3) ANOVA on percentage recall of these two pieces. We examined the effects of skill, age, 
and BCF rating by adding these variables as independent variables to a regression model 
(Piece and Position Type were entered as a repeated measures variable with 2 and 5 levels 
respectively). 
Results 
% Correct Recall 
Table 1 shows the mean recall by skill level and position type, for both standard (left 
side) and intersection positions (right side). Across all skill levels, recall was worse on the 
intersection positions. A 2-way Layout (Standard vs. Intersection) by Position Type (5 levels) 
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ANOVA yielded a large main effect of Layout, F (1, 31) = 82.5, p < .0001, and Position Type, 
F (4, 140) = 193.9, p < .0001. There was also a Layout by Position Type interaction, F (4, 
140) = 38.8, p < .0001, indicating that deterioration in recall on the intersection positions was 
most pronounced on the game positions (Table 1). However, follow-up analyses revealed 
that the effect of Layout was significant on all Position Types (all ps < .01). 
Table 2 reports the results of regression analyses on individual position types (% 
correct recall, intersection only). BCF rating significantly predicted recall only on the game 
positions; on these positions an increase of 100 BCF grading points (e.g., the difference 
between an average club player and a grandmaster) yielded an increase of about 10% in 
recall, which corresponds to about two and a half pieces.  VM significantly predicted recall 
on three of the non-game positions. Age tended to be negatively associated with recall, but 
only significantly so on the 1/3 randomized positions. 
Using general linear modeling (proc glm in SAS), we also conducted an omnibus 
regression analysis in which all five position types were included as a repeated measures 
variable with 5 levels. This analysis revealed a significant effect of VM, F (1, 32) = 6.65, p < 
.05, but no VM by position type interaction F (4, 128) = 0.24, p > .90, indicating that the 
association between VM and recall did no differ across position types. There was also a 
significant effect of BCF rating, F (1, 32) = 3.05, p < .05 (1-tailed), and a significant BCF 
rating by position type interaction F (4, 128) = 2.13, p < .05 (1-tailed), indicating that the 
association between BCF rating and recall was significantly moderated by position type. As 
illustrated in Table 2, BCF rating predicted recall on the game positions, but not the 
randomized positions. There was a trend toward a significant effect of age, F (1, 32) = 3.55, 
p = .07, and no age by position type interaction F (4, 128) = 0.57, p > .60. As expected, 
there was also a main effect of position type, F (4, 128) = 97.9, p < .001. 
Bishop vs. Knight Recall 
  Table 3 shows the mean percent recall of bishops and knights in intersection 
positions by skill level and position type. A Piece (Bishop vs. Knight) by Position Type (5 
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levels) ANOVA conducted on percent correct recall (on the intersection positions) revealed 
the expected main effect of Position Type, F (4, 140) = 10.0, p < .0001. Importantly, there 
was also a main effect of Piece, F (1, 35) = 16.9, p < .001, indicating that, averaged over all 
positions types, participants recalled Bishops (M = 11.9%, SE = 0.93) significantly better 
than Knights (M = 8.7%, SE = 0.90) on the intersection positions. This main effect was 
qualified by a significant Piece by Position Type interaction F (4, 140) = 14.9, p < .0001. 
Follow-up analyses indicated that participants were better at recalling bishops (vs. knights) 
on the (intersection) game and 1/3 positions (ps < .0001), but not on the other position types 
(all ps > .05). For comparison purposes, we also conducted a Piece (Bishop vs. Knight) by 
Position Type (game vs. 1/3 position) ANOVA on percent correct recall on the standard 
positions. This revealed no main effect of Piece, F (1, 35) = 0.03, p > .8, indicating that 
participants were not better at recalling Bishops (vs. Knights) on standard (non-shifted) 
game and 1/3 positions.  
A regression analysis on recall of bishops and knights (on the intersection positions) 
that incorporated BCF rating, age, and VM as independent variables yielded the expected 
main effect of BCF rating, F (1, 32) = 6.74, p < .01, and BCF rating by Position Type 
interaction, F (4, 128) = 4.22, p < .01, thereby paralleling the results reported above (for all 
pieces). There were no significant interactions involving Piece (all ps > .05), indicating that 
the effects of Piece noted above were not significantly moderated by BCF rating. 
Errors of Commission 
  Errors of commission occur when pieces are placed on incorrect squares. Over all 
participants, the mean number of errors of commission on the (intersection) game, 1/3, 2/3, 
random and 3/3 positions was 5.13 (SD = 3.70), 3.98 (SD = 3.98), 4.70 (SD = 4.63), 4.61 
(SD = 4.49), and 4.74 (SD = 4.54), respectively. There were no significant effects of BCF 
rating, age, or VM. An omnibus regression incorporating position type as a repeated 
measures variable also yielded no significant effects of BCF rating, age or VM. 
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  We examined errors of commission on bishops/knights on intersection positions. We 
reasoned that if participants were shifting the pieces in the mind’s eye along the SE-NW 
diagonal, participants would be more likely to misplace bishops on the intersections SE and 
NW of the target intersection than on the intersections SW and NE of the target intersection. 
Averaged over all positions types, the mean percentage of bishops misplaced on 
intersections SE/NW of the target intersection was 1.89 (SD = 1.97), and the mean 
percentage of bishops misplaced on intersections SW/NE of the target intersection was 1.25 
(SD = 1.90). This difference approached significance, F (1, 35) = 3.68, p = .06. The mean 
percentage of knights misplaced on intersections SE/NW and SW/NE of the target 
intersection was 1.54 (SD = 2.05) and 1.46 (SD = 2.53) respectively. This difference was not 
statistically significant. 
Discussion 
  Recall was impaired on the intersection positions compared to the standard positions 
(Table 1). Consistent with CHREST’s predictions, this impairment was especially 
pronounced on the intersection game positions (significant Layout by Position Type 
interaction). Our working assumption is that human processing is slowed down by the 
processes of carrying out mental transformations to re-center the pieces, which impairs the 
ability to access chunks/templates in the intersection game positions. 
  Skill effects were present on the intersection game positions, but not on the other 
positions (significant Skill by Position Type interaction). This interaction is consistent with 
CHREST’s predictions. Skill was not associated with errors of commission, meaning that the 
superior recall of better players did not come at a cost of more errors of commission. This 
means that the skill effect was unlikely to be due to more extensive guessing by the better 
players. 
  Participants were better at recalling bishops than knights on the intersection 
positions (but not the standard positions). We interpret this result to indicate the presence of 
mental imagery: the mental transformations were easier for the bishops than the knights. In 
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addition, participants tended to be more likely to misplace bishops on the intersections SE 
and NW of the target intersection than on the intersections SW and NE of the target 
intersection. This pattern of results is consistent with the use of mental imagery along the 
SE-NW diagonal, and provides some additional support for the presence of imagery. 
The evidence for imagery was stronger on the game and 1/3 intersection positions than on 
the other positions (significant Piece by Position Type interaction) (Table 3). Nonetheless, 
we do not rule out the possibility that some imagery was involved in all the positions. Note 
that mean recall of bishops/knights is poor (M = 8.7%) on the three most randomized 
positions (Table 3). Speculatively, on the more random positions, so few bishops/knights get 
shifted and actually get encoded in STM (as a piece or as part of a chunk) that the bishop 
vs. knight effect may be less visible in those positions.  
Human Study 2 
  Our working assumption is that the results obtained in human study 1 reflect imagery 
processes. For example, we assume that the poorer recall on the intersection (vs. standard) 
positions reflects the costs incurred by shifting the pieces in the mind’s eye before 
recognition can occur (on the intersection positions). The superior recall of bishops vs. 
knights provides more direct evidence that imagery plays a role. Nonetheless, it is also 
possible that the results in human study 1 reflect lower-level processes. For example, the 
unfamiliar intersection positions may require more or longer eye fixations than the standard 
positions. The effect of layout (in the human data) may therefore reflect the difference in 
how much information the participants are able to extract during the 5-s presentation. Thus, 
the results in human study 1 may reflect differences in visual processing, in addition to, or 
instead of, mechanisms of the mind's eye. 
  To address the role of lower-level factors, we re-examined recall data from an 
experiment that had high perceptual demands. Gobet and Simon (2000) included one 
condition in which participants had to recall positions which were presented for only 1 s. In 
this condition we assume that participants would have experienced difficulty in perceiving 
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the entire board. Both game and random positions were presented, using the standard 
layout (there were no intersection positions). If the superior recall of bishops over knights in 
the intersection condition was due to low-level processes, then the same superiority should 
be found in the 1-s condition. On the other hand, if this superiority was due to mental 
imagery, it should not be present in the 1-s condition, as there is no need to re-center the 
pieces in the mind’s eye.  
Method 
Participants 
  Twenty participants (mean age = 32.9 years, SD = 11.6) drawn from Gobet and 
Simon (2000) completed a 1 s recall task. Their mean Elo rating was 2131 (SD = 256).  
Further details of the participants and experimental procedures are available in Gobet and 
Simon (2000).  
Results 
  Mean recall of bishops/knights on the standard game and random positions is shown 
in Figure 4 (bottom panel). A repeated measures ANOVA revealed the expected main effect 
of Position, F (1, 19) = 11.7, p < .01, indicating that recall was better on game positions than 
random positions. There was no main effect of Piece, F (1, 19) = 2.32, p > .1, indicating that 
participants were not better at recalling bishops than knights. There was no Piece by 
Position interaction, F (1, 19) = 1.46, p > .1. A regression analysis that incorporated Elo 
rating as an independent variable yielded the expected main effect of Elo rating, F (1, 18) = 
22.6, p < .001, indicating that more skilled participants exhibited generally superior recall, 
and an Elo rating by Position Type interaction, F (1, 18) = 24.0, p < .001, indicating that skill 
effects were larger in the game positions than the random positions (i.e., the typical finding). 
There were no interactions between Piece and Elo rating (all ps > .1). 
Discussion 
  Recall in the 1-s presentation condition exhibited the expected Skill by Position Type 
interaction. However, in contrast with the results for the 5-s intersection position, participants 
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were not better at recalling bishops than knights. If anything, they were (non-significantly) 
better at recalling knights. Thus, the effect of Piece is specific to the 5-s intersection 
condition (middle panel, Figure 4), and does not appear either on the 5-s standard positions 
(upper panel, Figure 4) or the 1-s standard positions (lower panel, Figure 4). This 
demonstrates that there are qualitatively different patterns of recall in the two conditions that 
are perceptually challenging (5-s intersection, 1-s standard). We argue that this qualitatively 
different pattern of data likely reflects the presence of imagery processes on the 5-s 
intersection condition, but not on the 1-s (or 5-s) standard condition, at least on those 
conditions where the Piece effect is robust (intersection game positions).  
Computer Simulation Study 2  
In the simulations presented above, we assumed that, during perception, pieces 
within a chunk had to be re-centred individually (serially) in the mind’s eye, before chunks 
could be recognized. This assumption was consistent with Kosslyn et al.’s findings (1988), 
which showed that the generation of mental images is done serially. A more lenient 
assumption would be that a group of pieces could be shifted in parallel. We carried out 
simulations to test this alternative assumption. We kept the program the same as for the 
main simulations but assumed that a group of pieces lying within CHREST’s visual field 
could be shifted in parallel in 125 ms.  
The results of the simulation are shown in Table 1. While the r2 values are similar for 
the serial and parallel models (92% and 93% respectively, on average), the AAD values for 
the serial model were smaller than those observed with the parallel model (3.15 vs. 8.99 for 
the serial and parallel models, respectively). A similar outcome was observed with the SSE 
values (70.7 vs. 670.1 for the serial and parallel models, respectively). Thus, parallel shifting 
leads to a worse, rather than better, fit.   
General Discussion 
To study mental imagery and chunking, we created a new type of experimental 
material in which chess pieces were placed on the intersection between squares.  
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Predictions were made by running simulations with CHREST, a computational model of 
expertise. We manipulated the location of pieces (standard vs. intersection), skill, and 
position type.  The simulations assessed the effects of these manipulations on recall. An 
experiment with chessplayers assessed the accuracy of CHREST’s predictions. 
CHREST made several predictions that related to processes putatively carried out in 
the mind’s eye. First, CHREST predicted that intersection positions should be recalled worse 
than standard positions.  This effect was clearly present in the human data (significant effect 
of Layout; Table 1). Second, within the intersection positions, CHREST predicted that the 
skill difference in recall should be larger with the game positions than with the randomized 
positions. This was observed in the human data (significant Skill by Position Type 
interaction; Tables 1, 2). A skill effect was only robust on the game positions, and was not 
observed on the randomized positions (Table 2). Third, the time parameters of CHREST 
were also well supported. In general, the data supported the idea that pieces must be re-
centred in the mind’s eye before pattern recognition can happen, and they also provided 
support for the assumption that the transition-time is 125 ms.  
Despite these successes, data from the human experiment challenged CHREST’s 
predictions. CHREST predicted significant skill slopes on all intersection positions, but the 
data revealed that a significant slope was only observed on the game positions (Table 2). It 
is possible that the skill effects on the randomized positions are too small to be detected 
reliably in our experiment (note that the slopes all had positive values with the human data, 
although the slope with the random positions was negligible).   
The study had strengths. First, given that chess memory is a well-studied area, we 
used a memory task to study imagery. There was direct evidence that imagery did indeed 
play an important role in the memory task: We found that participants were better at recalling 
bishops than knights on the intersection positions, presumably because they found it easier 
to manipulate the bishop in the mind’s eye given that the transition for the bishop (but not 
knight) is congruent with its typical movement. This Stroop-like interference effect parallels 
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that reported by Bachman and Oit (1992) using a different imagery task, and provides 
additional evidence that imagery played an important role in task performance. The pattern 
of errors of commission for bishops and knights was also supportive of imagery processes 
along the SE-NW diagonal line (Human Study 1).  
  Second, we note that CHREST makes absolute predictions about performance, and 
that these predictions were correct in a number of cases. For example, the decrease in 
recalling game positions in the intersection condition as compared to the standard condition 
is explained by the fact that the ability to access chunks and templates, whose core consists 
of large chunks, is made harder. This in turn is explained by the assumption that carrying 
out mental transformations in the mind’s eye to re-center the pieces has a time cost, 
specified by the base and square CHREST parameters.  
  Third, the seriality assumption was supported by the data (Simulation Study 2). We 
emphasize that CHREST had simulated a number of phenomena (e.g., recall of game and 
random positions or positions modified by mirror-images) several years before the current 
data were collected. While the model has several parameters, they are all set and thus the 
number of degrees of freedom of the model is small. The main degree of freedom is the type 
and amount of input used to let CHREST acquire chunks and templates. To our knowledge, 
no other theory of expertise makes predictions at this level of detail.  
Last, we recruited a sample of players ranging from weak club players to 
grandmasters which was of sufficient size to detect the modest associations present in the 
data. 
The study also had a number of limitations.  The imagery task we used was 
somewhat artificial (e.g., compared to a check detection task). For example, in our task the 
pieces only needed to be mentally shifted half-a-square (rather than up to 7 squares), and 
they also only needed to be mentally shifted in the diagonal plane (and not in the 
horizontal/vertical place). Strictly speaking, therefore, our results only pertain to a special 
case of imagery that is atypical for chess players. Thus, the generalizability of the findings is 
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not clear. Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the timing data derived from our task converge 
with estimates derived from different tasks. In addition, our procedures did not allow us to 
address fine-grained questions about the psychological processes underlying the imagery. 
For example, we do not know the extent to which the re-centering is conducted 
automatically or whether it is partly under conscious control.  
In addition, the simulations were conducted in a manner as close as possible to 
earlier simulations. Later versions of CHREST will have to (a) better capture the detail of 
how the mind’s eye generates and maintains visual images; and (b) model the differential 
recall of bishops and knights. Both these issues were outside the scope of the current 
paper. Later versions may also address the import of additional assumptions (e.g., the re-
placement assumption in recall). 
In conclusion, the simulation and human data reported in this paper have shed light 
on mental imagery and chunking. Perhaps the most arresting finding is that CHREST’s time 
parameters, which were based on the sparse and somewhat inconsistent data available to 
De Groot and Gobet (1996), turned out to be surprisingly accurate. While previous 
simulations have supported CHREST’s mechanisms for explaining perception and memory 
(e.g., De Groot & Gobet, 1996), the present paper establishes the plausibility of CHREST’s 
mechanisms for explaining mental imagery, at least in the domain of chess. 
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Footnotes 
1
 Pointers might be implemented by short-term memory neurons in the prefrontal cortex 
firing in synchrony with neurons in posterior areas of the brain.  Capacity of STM (i.e., the 
number of pointers that can be held simultaneously in STM) would then be a function of the 
number of distinct frequencies available (e.g. Ruchkin, Grafman, Cameron, & Berndt, 2003). 
2
 The BCF (British Chess Federation) rating is an interval scale ranking competitive chess 
players, similar to the Elo rating (Elo, 1978), a more widely used rating system.  Skill levels 
have standard names, which are used consistently in this paper (in parentheses, the 
approximate corresponding range in BCF points): grandmaster (GM, normally above 240), 
international master (IM, 225 - 240), master (200-225), expert (175-200), class A players 
(150-175), class B players (125-150), and so on.  There is an international FIDE rating (also 
called Elo rating) but usually national federations have their own rating (e.g., BCF). 
The formula for converting BCF into Elo is: (BCF*5)+1250.  The World Chess Federation 
(FIDE, Fédération Internationale des Echecs) publishes rating lists of its members every 
three months and awards titles such as grandmaster. 
3 There are two ways that the knight move is typically taught, one combining horizontal and 
vertical movements (2 squares, 1 square; 1 square, 2 squares) and the second involving a 
horizontal or vertical move then a diagonal move outward (1 square, 1 square). Thus, under 
certain conditions, the knight could be imagined as moving diagonally. However, the 
diagonal movement is clearly less closely associated with the knight than with the bishop 
(which only moves diagonally). In addition, we suspect that adult chess players typically 
represent the knight’s movement as a straight line between the home and target square (and 
not in terms of horizontal/vertical/diagonal shifts). 
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Table 1 
Recall by Net Size/Skill and Position Type 
  Standard   Intersection     
Net Size Skill Game 1/3 2/3 Rand. 3/3  Trans.  Game 1/3 2/3 Rand. 3/3  R2 AAD SSE 
               300k  79.5 52.8 26.2 21.7 15.2  serial 44.8    27.9    17.5    15.3    10.7     0.94    5.1     165.7 
        parallel 68.9 42.2 24.1 19.8 14.2  0.95 15.5 1608.5 
 
GMs 83.7    28.7 20.3 18.3    14.8    
  
40.4    19.7    10.8    9.5    11.2    
    
 
      
  
         15k  62.5 36.3 19.5 16.6 11.3  serial 37.9    22.9    14.5    11.4     7.5     0.94    2.6      42.2    
  
     
 parallel 54.3 31.7 18.6 15.3 10.7  0.96 8.3 549.0 
 
Experts 61.3    25.9 19.1 17.0    16.3 
  
36.4    19.6    10.1    12.2    10.5 
    
 
      
  
         3k  49.4 28.1 17.1 14.4 8.7  serial 30.4    19.4    12.2    9.5     5.4     0.91    2.7      44.4    
  
     
 parallel 47.5 26.4 16.4 13.7 8.0  0.95 6.7 341.3 
 
Class A/B 55.1    22.2 16.2 14.1    13.7      32.6    17.8    10.4    12.3    10.5    
    
 
      
  
         1k  37.6 24.5 15.9 13.3 7.2  serial 23.7    15.7    10.4    8.1     4.1     0.90    2.2      30.5    
  
     
 parallel 33.6 23.0 15.4 12.4 6.1  0.88 5.4 182.4 
 
Class C/D 40.1    16.9 15.4 12.3     12.0   
  
26.3    15.6    7.4     9.7     7.7   
    
Note: Mean % recall by Net Size/Skill and Position Type. Data are shown for transition-time = 125 ms. The human data, broken down by skill-level, are 
shown for comparison (data in bold). Key: Trans. = transition type; serial = pieces shifted in series (one-by-one) in the mind’s eye, parallel = pieces 
shifted in parallel (as a group) in the mind’s eye; AAD = average absolute deviation (the smaller, the better); SSE = sum of squared errors (the smaller, 
the better). GMs = Grandmasters (n = 7), Experts (n = 12), Class A/B (n = 10), Class C/D (n = 7). 
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Table 2 
% Correct Recall: Results of Multiple Regression Analyses. 
Position Type R2 BCF rating Age VM 
Game 15% 0.10* (0.05) -0.25 (0.31) 0.45 (0.34) 
  0.32* (0.18) -0.15 (0.18) 0.22 (0.17) 
One-Third Randomized 25% 0.029 (0.028) -0.38* (0.16) 0.30#  (0.18) 
  0.17 (0.17) -0.40* (0.17) 0.27#  (0.16) 
Two-Thirds Randomized 24% 0.019 (0.018) -0.16 (0.10) 0.26* (0.11) 
  0.18 (0.17) -0.27 (0.17) 0.37* (0.16) 
Random 30% 0.001 (0.015) -0.15# (0.09) 0.27** (0.10) 
  0.01 (0.16) -0.29# (0.16) 0.42** (0.15) 
Truly Randomized 27% 0.023# (0.017) -0.10 (0.10) 0.30** (0.11) 
  0.22# (0.16) -0.17 (0.17) 0.43** (0.15) 
 
Note. For each position type, a regression was performed by entering BCF rating, Age, and 
VM in the same block as independent variables. The dependent variable was percentage 
recall. For each regression, the R2, unstandardized (upper row), and standardized (lower 
row) parameter estimates (SE), are shown (for each predictor). 
Key: VM = Visual Memory; # p < 0.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. All p values for effects of BCF 
rating refer to one-tailed tests; other p values reflect two-tailed tests.  
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Table 3 
% Recall of Bishops and Knights, Intersection Positions 
 Bishops  Knights 
Skill Game 1/3 2/3 Rand. 3/3  Game 1/3 2/3 Rand. 3/3 
           GMs 35.7 
(22.9)    
13.7 
(9.22) 
2.38 
(4.30) 
8.50 
(6.82) 
9.75 
(7.62) 
 10.7 
(8.63)    
4.11 
(4.06) 
10.3 
(4.87) 
11.1 
(13.4) 
7.32 
(4.22) 
            Experts 24.3 
(18.6) 
14.9 
(12.0) 
2.78 
(11.1) 
11.1 
(6.80) 
11.0 
(7.96) 
 11.5 
(11.3) 
7.08 
(8.55) 
7.29 
(7.26) 
12.7 
(10.7) 
8.86 
(7.50) 
            Class A/B 21.7 
(14.8) 
13.8 
(8.57) 
6.11 
(6.65) 
10.5 
(8.11) 
7.62 
(9.52) 
 6.25 
(13.5) 
7.38 
(7.32) 
6.46 
(7.99) 
16.5 
(13.2) 
9.92 
(6.97) 
            Class C/D 9.52 
(7.50) 
11.3 
(11.5) 
6.35 
(5.00) 
7.65 
(9.11) 
6.24 
(6.36) 
 3.57 
(6.10) 
4.11 
(4.06) 
5.26 
(9.60) 
11.1 
(6.59) 
8.34 
(7.45) 
            All (N = 36) 22.9 
(18.3) 
13.7 
(10.1) 
4.32 
(5.16) 
9.76 
(7.46) 
8.88 
(7.97) 
 8.33 
(10.8) 
6.01 
(6.69) 
7.25 
(7.46) 
13.1 
(11.2) 
8.75 
(6.60) 
Note: Mean % recall (SD) of Bishops, Knights by Skill and Position Type. GMs = Grandmasters (n = 7), Experts (n = 12), Class A/B (n = 10), 
Class C/D (n = 7). 
   
  Mental Imagery and Chunks 
  
 35 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. CHREST consists of 4 components: a simulated eye, a discrimination network 
giving access to LTM, a short-term memory, and a mind’s eye. The simulated eye selects a 
portion of the external display (the “visual field”), shown by (a) in the Figure 1. This 
information is sent both to the mind’s eye (b) and LTM (c). If the information is recognized in 
LTM by accessing a node (i.e., a chunk), a pointer to this chunk is put in STM (d), and the 
information is unpacked in the mind’s eye (e). In turn, the information in the mind’s eye can 
be used to access a node in LTM (f). Note that LTM chunks encode information about 
location (e.g., the two white pieces on the 1st row would be encoded as Rook on f1 and King 
on g1. 
Figure 2. Processes involved in shifting pieces in the mind’s eye in CHREST (see text for 
details). The circle in the top diagram reminds the reader that the diagram is within the 
current visual field, and the coordinates that chunks encode information about location. 
Figure 3a.  Examples of the 5 position types used in the experiment (Intersection positions). 
Figure 3b.  Recall requirements for standard (top) and intersection (bottom) positions. On 
intersection positions, participants were required to place pieces on the intersections of 
squares. 
Figure 4. Recall of Bishop vs. Knight as a function of the type of position (game and random) 
and type of experiment (standard layout, 5 s; intersection layout, 5 s; and standard layout, 1 
s).
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Figure 3a
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Figure 3b 
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